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COMMENTS
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN
On January 1, 1979, the United States established diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) I. The terms
of their agreement required the United States to recognize only one
government for China.2 This objective was accomplished by virtue
of the Taiwan Relations Act on April 10, 1979. 3
1. 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2022 (1979); see also 21 PEKING REVIEW No. 51 (Dec. 22, 1978),
at 8-9; HARRY HsIN-I HSIAO, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN SINCE THE NORMALIZA-
TION OF THE SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP 162 (1983).
2. 79 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 1, at 2022. Prior to the 1979 enactment of the Tai-
wan Relations Act, the United States recognized the Kuomingtang government of the Re-
public of China as the sole governing body of all of China. See generally, Simon, Legal
Developments in U.S.-ROC Trade Since Derecogniion, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 203, 204 (1983).
3. Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Taiwan Rela-
tions Act]. The specific language of the Act provides as follows:
(a) The President having terminated governmental relations between the United
States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as
the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enact-
ment of this Act is necessary-
(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the con-
tinuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the
United States and the people on Taiwan.
(b) It is the policy of the United States-
(I) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural
and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Tai-
wan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the
Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security,
and economic interests of the United States and are matters of international con-
cern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future
of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and se-
curity of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or eco-
nomic system, of the people on Taiwan.
(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States
in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all of the approxi-
mately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement
of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives
of the United States.
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In this agreement, the Nationalist government 4 of the Republic
of China (ROC), better known as Taiwan, was derecognized. As a
result, the United States no longer views the Nationalist govern-
ment as a viable government for Taiwan.5 This sequence of events
has served to further enhance a growing attitude in the interna-
tional community recognizing the need for Taiwan to be governed
by a more representative body.
6
For over four centuries, the island of Taiwan and mainland
China have generally existed as separate entities.7 The people on
both sides of the Taiwan Straits which separate Taiwan from main-
land China are of Chinese lineage. Periods of separation, however,
have made the political and economic situations of each group di-
verse.' One of the few points on which both sides agree is that
China is "one" and that Taiwan is a province of China.9
The PRC insists that foreign governments recognize it as the
sole government of China. Furthermore, the PRC refuses diplo-
matic relations to any government that maintains diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan. l° The PRC's view is that one day Taiwan will
be reunited with China even if force is required to accomplish that
goal."' On the other hand, the Nationalist government of the ROC
also rejects the "two China" or "one Taiwan, one China" policy. 2
The Nationalist government maintains that it represents the whole
of China.13 Recognizing the conflict of the objectives sought by the
PRC and the ROC, the United States has traditionally sought a
4. The Nationalist government is also referred to as the Kuomingtang. These terms
will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this Comment.
5. Oakes, Identity Crisis, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1980, at A 19, col. 2.
6. Taiwan.- Hearings on Taiwan Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 550-51 (1979), [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1971, at 15, col. 1; July 1, 1976, at 28, col. 3; Sep. 3, 1976, at AI8, col. 5; Li, .4 Perspective on
Taiwan, 14 INT'L LAW. 73, 75 (1980).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 34-60. See also Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24,
1984, at 22, col. 1.
8. See S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,7 (testimony of Dr. Richard C. Kagan,
Assistant Professor of History, Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.), reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 650, 654.
9. Clough, Taiwan's International Status, 1 CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L AFF. 17, 18 (H.
Chiu ed. 1981).
10. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 598; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
11. See, Clough supra note 9, at 18; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
12. Clough, supra note 9, at 18. The Nationalist government bases this claim on the fact
that their government was established on the mainland in 1948. They claim that the Com-
munist takeover of the mainland is only a temporary "militant" occupation of their country.
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policy of non-intervention to the extent that peace would be pro-
moted in the Asian Pacific.'
4
Of the 17 million people that inhabit the island of Taiwan,15
eighty-five percent have descendants who qualify as natives of the
island.' 6 The remaining 15 percent are considered mainland Chi-
nese. 1 7 The majority of the Nationalist government's power rests
with this fifteen percent of Taiwan's population.' 8
In 1947, the mainland Chinese (or Chinese Nationals, as they
are also referred to in the ROC), came to power in Taiwan. 19 These
Chinese Nationals from the mainland founded the new Nationalist
government on the premise that the ROC was the sole governing
body for all of China.2" When the Chinese Nationals established
their new government on Taiwan,2 the officials they had elected to
office on the mainland were transplanted to govern the new Repub-
lic of China.22 The Nationalist government claimed that they rep-
resented the whole of China's 500 million people,23 and that the 8
million native Taiwanese comprised only 3 percent of that body.24
As a result, the Nationalist government apportioned representation
accordingly and allowed native Taiwanese to hold only three per-
cent of the governmental positions on Taiwan. 25 Many of the same
officials who were relocated to Taiwan in 1949 continue to hold
office in the Republic of China's government today. Their average
14. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 15 (testimony of the Honorable Warren Christopher,
Deputy Secretary, United States Department of State).
15. Id. at 579. Taiwan's population as of the 1979 census was approximately 17.8 mil-
lion people. Estimates today range between 17.8 to 18 million people.
16. "Native" as used here refers to those people who occupied Taiwan prior to 1947.
These people were primarily of Chinese descent, from the mainland province of Fukien.
This also includes the "aborigines" that are credited as the original inhabitants of the island.
It is speculated that these "aborigines" were of Malay descent. Li, supra note 6, at 75; see
also N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1975, at 22, col. 2.
17. 5 U.N. SCOR (527th mtg.) at 6 (1950), as cited in Jwain, The Legal Status of For-
mosa, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 25, 33 (1963).
18. See infra notes 23-25.
19. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING, as cited in Hearings, supra note 6, at 555.
20. Id L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, FORMOSA, CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 83
(1967); see also Hearings, supra note 6, at 599 (statement of A. Doak Barnett).
21. L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 83.
22. Hearings, supra note 6, at 879 (Bulletin of the Peace Studies Institute, Manchester
College, Aug. 1976).
23. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 598.
24. At the time of the establishment of the PRC and the ROC, Taiwan's population was
8 million as compared to the 500 million people in mainland China.
25. L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 134.
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age is now 78 years; this factor will necessitate their replacement in
the near future.
Moreover, subsequent to their occupation of Taiwan, the Na-
tionalists imposed martial law on the island in order to suppress
any Communist or native Taiwanese movement which might seek
to overthrow their new government.26 This state of martial law has
continued since 1949,27 depriving the native Taiwanese majority of
the constitutional rights that were conferred to them by the Nation-
alist government at the time of its inception on the mainland.28
Currently, there exists a strong movement, both on Taiwan
and abroad, to recognize the wishes of the vast numbers of under-
represented people who reside there.29 The Taiwanese people want
the right to determine their own government on the basis of the
international legal principle of self-determination, 3 and seek to es-
tablish an independent and sovereign State on Taiwan. 3' This
Comment explores how the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act
of 197932 provides an indication that the United States government
approves of a native Taiwanese movement toward independence
through self-determination. The historical background of the is-
land is first discussed, with emphasis on the long-time separate
existence of Taiwan and mainland China. The differences resulting
from the divergent political and economic backgrounds are
stressed. The principle of self-determination in international law is
then reviewed relative to the Taiwan issue. This discussion is fol-
lowed by an examination of the events which have brought about a
conscious awareness of the principle of self-determination and the
demand for independence among the native Taiwanese. The barri-
ers which have thwarted advancements of the Taiwanese indepen-
26. See Political Repression in "Free China," 116 CONG. REc. E7953-56 (1970) (speech
of Donald M. Fraser).
27. Hearings, supra note 6, at 389, 546, 874; see also Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1979, at A8, col.
I.
28. Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1979, at A8, col. 1.
29. There is extensive documentation on the Taiwan Independence Movement in mate-
rial published by the World United Formosan's for Independence (WUFI). Hearings on the
United States Relations with the People's Republic of China Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 347-61, 463-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
United States Relations with the PRC]; The Question ofSelf-Determination/or Formosa-Tai-
wan, 116 CONG. REC. E9345-46 (1970); Hearings, supra note 6 at 546; L. CHEN & H. LASS-
WELL, supra note 20, at 185-200.
30. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 7, col. 5; Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
31. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 551-2 (testimony of Wilbur Chen, Representative of
the Overseas Alliance for Democratic Rule in Taiwan).
32. See Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
Vol. 14
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dence movement to date are then analyzed. Finally, this Comment
discusses how the Taiwan Relations Act33 has afforded a positive
means for the people of Taiwan to establish an independent State
through the international legal principle of self-determination, and
a proposal is presented as a means by which this objective might be
accomplished.
I. TAIWAN AND CHINA AS Two SEPARATE ENTITIES
A. Historical Background
Taiwan is an island which lies 110 miles to the southeast of
mainland China. It is separated from the mainland by the Taiwan
or Formosa Straits.34 It is unknown when the first inhabitants came
to Taiwan, but it is known that its first natives were aborigines of
Malay descent. 35 In the late 1600's, dissident mainland Chinese be-
gan to cross the Formosa Straits and settle in Taiwan in substantial
numbers.36 Shortly thereafter, the Portugese, Dutch and Spanish
began to establish settlements on the island.37 At that time, the
mainland Chinese government was neither concerned with, nor
able to prevent such migration.
38
In 1683, the Ching Dynasty of mainland China annexed Tai-
wan and thereafter maintained very loose control over the nation
for two centuries. 39 Even though Taiwan was a Chinese province
at that time, China often declined responsibility for the island. For
example, in 1871 a Japanese vessel was shipwrecked off the shore of
Taiwan and all of its inhabitants were murdered by Taiwanese ab-
origines. When Japan asked for a remedy, the answer of the Chi-
nese government was that "it could not be responsible for outrages
committed outside its jurisdiction."4
The Chinese occupation ended in 1895 when China ceded Tai-
wan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki.4 The Treaty pro-
33. Id
34. L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 82.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. G. KERR, FORMOSA: LICENSED REVOLUTION AND THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT
1895-1945 1-10 (1974).
38. Id
39. L. CHEN & H. LASWELL, supra note 20, at 82.
40. Id.
41. Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, 181 Parry's T.S. 217, as citedin 1 AM. J. INT'L
L. 378 (Supp. 1907). Article II reads: "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sover-
eignty the following territories, together with all fortifications thereon: . . . (b) The Island
5
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vided the Taiwanese people a two-year period in which they could
choose to remain in Taiwan or return to mainland China. Almost
all of the population chose to remain in Taiwan;42 in fact, only 0.16
percent of the population opted for Chinese nationality. 43 This ac-
tion, however, was by no means a reflection of the Taiwanese peo-
ple's allegiance to Japan. Soon after the cession to Japan, the
Taiwanese revolted and established the Republic of Taiwan.
Within a year, however, their Republic was crushed by Japanese
forces. 44
During the half-century that Japan controlled Taiwan, the so-
cial and economic development of Taiwan changed dramatically
from that of mainland China. By 1939, Taiwan's per capita foreign
trade value was thirty-nine times that of mainland China.45 After
the end of World War II, Japan surrendered Taiwan to the Allied
Forces in the Pacific which were under the direction of General
Chiang Kai-Shek.46 In October, 1945, as the Administrator Gen-
eral and Supreme Commander in the Taiwan area, Chiang estab-
lished the Nationalist government on Taiwan.47
The native Taiwanese at first welcomed the Nationalist re-
gime. Shortly thereafter, however, they became disillusioned when
the Nationalists proved more oppressive than the Japanese. 48 His-
torians point out that "the corruption and graft of the Nationalist
officials was unprecedented in the history of the island."49
Taiwanese rage at the Nationalist government oppression climaxed
on February 28, 1947, when the Nationalist police killed a
Taiwanese woman for selling untaxed cigarettes. The incident led
to a nationwide uprising."0 As a result, an estimated 12,000 to
of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all the islands appertaining or belonging to said island of
Formosa."
42. YUZIN CHIAOTAONG NG, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN (1971), as cited in Chen, W/ho Owns Taiwan. A Searchfor Inter-
national Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1972).
43. Id
44. Lamley, The 1895 Taiwan Republic. A Signocant Episode in Modern Chinese His-
tory, 27 J. ASIAN STUDIES 739 (1968).
45. G. BARCLAY, COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION IN TAIWAN 33 (1954),
quoted in R. N. CLOUGH, ISLAND CHINA 72 (1978).
46. Japan surrendered their sovereignty over Taiwan in the peace treaty signed at San
Francisco on Sep. 8, 1951. See infra note 61.
47. See L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 83.
48. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 867 (testimony of Dr. Richard Kagan, Assistant Pro-
fessor of History, Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.).
49. See L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 83.
50. Id. at 612. An excellent documentation of the incident may be found in G. KERR,
Vol. 14
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20,000 native Taiwanese leaders were seized, tortured, and brutally
killed in March, 1947, by the occupational forces of Chiang Kai-
Shek.5'
On January 21, 1949, General Chiang Kai-Shek resigned his
post as the President of the ROC to return to the mainland conflict
between the Communist and remaining Nationalists. At that time,
he was succeeded by Vice-President Li Tsung-Jai.5 2 On October 1,
1949, the Chinese Communists led by Mao Tse-Tung defeated the
Nationalist forces on the mainland, and established the PRC.
53
Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan with the remaining military and
civilian personnel of the ROC's Nationalist or "Kuomingtang"
government.
5 4
On March 1, 1950, Chiang reappointed himself "President" of
the "Republic of China." He then commenced the organization of
the new government on Taiwan by installing the majority of the
transported mainland Nationalist officials in leadership positions."
In addition, Chiang declared a permanent state of martial law on
Taiwan. Despite the non-involvement of the people of the island in
the Chinese civil war, he sought to justify his rule as a safeguard
against a Chinese Communist Rebellion.
56
The new Nationalist government immediately pronounced
that its rule over the 500 million people of mainland China was
only being temporarily interrupted by the Communist take-over.
The Kuomingtang also asserted that it was still the legitimate gov-
ernment of both the 500 million Chinese on the mainland and the 8
million inhabitants of Taiwan. As a result, the Nationalists
claimed that the size of the native population required only a three
percent proportionate representation. 5 The Nationalists countered
any objection to their systematic suppression of Taiwanese liberties
with the use of military force under the declared state of martial
law.
58
Although Chiang asserted dominion over the island of Taiwan
FORMOSA BETRAYED 254-59 (1965). Mr. Kerr was a United States consular officer in Taipei
at the time and witnessed the uprising.
51. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 867.
52. See L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 613.
53. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 866.
54. See id. at 38 (statement of Congressman Donald M. Fraser).
55. See id. at 598 (testimony of A. Doak Barnett, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institu-
tion, Washington, D.C.); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
56. See supra text accompanying note 19.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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by virtue of the Nationalist government, the United States and
other nations did not readily acknowledge the government's legal
status. President Truman declared the "neutralization of For-
mosa" 59 and dispatched the United States Seventh Fleet to the Tai-
wan Straits to thwart conflicts arising from either side. He stated
that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await
the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with
Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."60
B. Taiwan's Unsettled International Status
In 1951, Japan signed a peace treaty which removed all of its
right, title, and claim to Taiwan.6 However, the treaty did not
specify to whom Taiwan would be delivered.62 When the United
States Senate ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, insuring
military protection to the people of Taiwan,63 it was mindful of the
unsettled status of Taiwan. In order to avoid misinterpretation,
Congress included the language, "that nothing in the present treaty
shall be construed as effecting or modifying the legal status or the
sovereignty [of Taiwan]". 6'
The language of both treaties unquestionably terminated Ja-
pan's sovereignty over Taiwan, but neither one indicated to whom
sovereignty passed.6 5 The question thus arose as to what effect this
failure to name a successor would have on the people of Taiwan.
Representatives of several countries began to assert that the omis-
sion by the United Nations was intended to afford Taiwan a basis
for self-determination under the United Nations Charter. For ex-
ample, the Egyptian representative stated: "My government trusts
that the reason behind this omission is to afford the opportunity to
deal with this question in accordance with the United Nations
Charter, taking into consideration the principle of self-determina-
tion and the expressed desire of the inhabitants of these
59. 23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 5 (1950). Taiwan was previously known as Formosa.
60. Id
61. U.S.-Japan Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45,
reprinted in 25 DEP'T ST. BULL. 349 (1951).
62. See 25 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 61, at 349.
63. Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China, Dec. 2, 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 UNT.S. 213.
64. Id.; see also Taiwan. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Mutual
Defense Treaty with Republic of China, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
65. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 4392, CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION AND
SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 93 (1951).
Vol. 14
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In addition, the United Kingdom interpreted the omission as
follows:
The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty
over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does
not determine the future of these islands . . . . Until China
shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and princi-
ples, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem
of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accord
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.67
Taiwan's uncertain legal status was reiterated by Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, when he declared: "It is the understanding of
the Senate that nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as
affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty of the ter-
ritories referred to in Article VI (that is, Formosa and the
Pescadores)."68
Shortly after France recognized the PRC in 1964,69 President
Georges Pompidou also made clear that through the peace treaty
with Japan, "Formosa (Taiwan) was detached from Japan, but it
was not attached to anyone."7 It would appear from the above
discussion that Taiwan's legal status as an independent State is un-
decided. This unsettled status suggests that the native Taiwanese
are in a position to pursue national independence.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Sou ces of the Principle of Sef Determination
The right of national independence, which has come to be
called the principle of self-determination, is the belief that each
"nation"'" has a right to independently determine its own form of
government.7 2 The concept of self-determination is enshrined in
66. Id. at 144.
67. Id at 93.
68. See 31 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 61, at 896 (testimony of John Foster Dulles,
United States Secretary of State).
69. The actual date of recognition was January 27, 1964.
70. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1964, at 4, col. 4. See also Self-Determination for Taiwan, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1964, at 36, col. 2.
71. The term "nation" has been defined as a common relationship as to birth or origin
and implies a common race, usually characterized by community of language and customs.
I G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 47 (1940);
72. A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 39 (1969).
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the United Nations Charter in Articles 1 and 55.73 It has been fre-
quently and vigorously invoked since World War II as a principle
allowing various factions to seek independence in international
law.7 4 In light of its wide acceptance and successful application by
entities seeking independence, the principle of self-determination is
now a well-established rule in international law.7
5
At the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
a decision was made to include the right to self-determination in
the Covenants on Human Rights.76 This was deemed necessary
because experience had shown that violations of the right of self-
determination had led to several wars, and the denial of such a
right was viewed as a constant threat to peace." Therefore, the UN
73. Articles I and 55 of the U.N. CHARTER specifically refer to self-determination as an
international legal principle. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1 and 55. Article I reads as follows:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
that might lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropri-
ate measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
(4) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
Article 55 reads as follows:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
74. See generally W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-47 (1977).
75. Id. at 147. Ofuatey-Kodjoe states that: "[T]oday there is no doubt that self-determi-
nation, as defined in UN and general international practice, is a principle in international
law which yields a right to self-government that can be claimed legitimately by bona fide
dependent peoples." Id.
76. 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1965). The resolution which
was adopted by the General Assembly stated that an article was to be placed in the Cove-
nants to the effect that: "All persons shall have the right of Self-determination." G.A. Res.
545, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
77. GA. Res. 545, supra note 76.
Vol. 14
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was
adopted in final form in 1966, provided that "all peoples have the
right to self-determination.""8 In addition, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights included the language that for self-determi-
nation claims, "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or ter-
ritory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non self-governing, or under any limitation of sovereignty."79
The preliminary text of the UN Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights supporting the right to self-determination was drafted
and discussed by the Tenth Session of the General Assembly."
Paragraph 1 of that draft states that: "all peoples and all nations
shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right freely
to determine their political, economic, social, and cultural status."' ,
The Twenty-First Session of the UN General Assembly moderately
changed the wording of the Covenant and adopted it in its final
form on December 16, 1966.82 Presently, it reads: "All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
8s3
The UN Charter discusses the principle of self-determination
as being "of peoples and nations."8 4 By contrast, both of the UN
Covenants 5 add a higher degree of definition when they speak of
an actual "right to self-determination for all peoples. 816 The term
"nations," as used in the UN Charter, is clearly avoided by the UN
Covenants, due to the fact that misunderstandings were likely to
result.
8 7
Since its initial exposure under the UN Charter, the concept of
78. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
79. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at art. 2 (1948); see also UMORURIKE, SELF-DE-
TERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1972).
80. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 76, at 71.
81. Id. The original draft implied that a "nation" of peoples seeking independence
must exist before the resolution would be applied to them.
82. Cited in final form as: U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
83. Id at art. 1. Here the term "nation" is deleted from the resolution making it appli-
cable to "all peoples" regardless of whether they are a part of a recognized nation.
84. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
85. Referring to U.N. CHARTER arts. I and 55; see supra note 73.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 76; see also Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3 (emphasis
added).
87. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 76, at 69.
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self-determination continues to be confirmed as an international le-
gal principle. The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations88 includes the
right to self-determination among its seven enunciated principles.
The right to self-determination is apparent in the final version of
the sixth principle which states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all
peoples have the right freely to determine, without external in-
terference, their political status and to pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural development, and every State has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Char-
ter. Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and sepa-
rate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter and to render assistance to the United Nations in
carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter
regarding the implementation of the principle .... 89
Obviously, the UN Covenants and the subsequent Declaration
suggest a viable basis for the international legal principle of self-
determination. Furthermore, it is clear that this principle provides
a universal "right" to self-determination for all peoples, regardless
of the type of political system under which they live.90 Yet even in
light of the explicit wording of these instruments, some scholars
contend that such provisions have no legal effect.9 ' Accordingly,
they argue that the language used by the Charter ". . . does not
allow the interpretation that the members are under legal obliga-
tions regarding the rights and freedoms mentioned in the preamble
or text of the Charter."'92 It is also argued that "[t]he United Na-
tions can only take action in areas of human rights and self-deter-
mination when a breach of these rights are of such enormity as to
constitute a danger to the world peace. In essence, the provision of
88. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Principles of International Law].
89. This is the language that appears in the Declaration as adopted by the UN General
Assembly on Oct. 24, 1970. Id.
90. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 29 (1950).
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the Charter is merely exhortary rather than legally mandatory. 93
The more persuasive view however, maintains that the provi-
sions of the Charter do indeed have legal effect.9 4 It is pointed out
that the mere absence of a sufficient means of implementation and
lack of precise definition does not detract from the principle's legal-
ity.95 There is a mandatory obligation implied in the provisions of
Article 55 that the United Nations shall promote respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom. 96 There is
a distinct element of a legal duty in the understanding as expressed
in Article 56." The minimum duty then, according to this view, is
that the members of the United Nations refrain from obstructing
the promotion of human rights, including the right to self-
determination.98
Generally, the principle of self-determination is given promi-
nence by the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly's
string of resolutions that have followed.99 Writers and commenta-
tors on the principle of self-determination have repeatedly recog-
nized its legal significance in international law."° In addition, the
nations represented in the UN adhere to the intent of that organiza-
tion "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace." 1o'





98. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLIT-
ICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 119 (1963).
99. The Principle has been reaffirmed almost annually by the General Assembly. See,
e.g., G.A. Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A.
Res. 1810, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1956,
18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res. 2189, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2326, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2548, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969); G.A. Res. 2621, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
100. R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN AN ERA OF DECOLONIZATION,
12 (1964); D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 337-8 (1965); see also U. UMOZURIKE,
supra note 79, at 623; A. COBBAN, supra note 72, at 39; W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 74,
at 129.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
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B. Assertion of the Principle of Seif-Determination
The United Nations affords all peoples the right to self-deter-
mination. 1°2 The General Assembly has declared that it is within
its sole discretion to determine when a people may claim self-
rule.0 3 It is well established that the United Nations will only rec-
ognize a country's movement toward self-determination where that
movement has met the criteria of at least one of two tests.1°4 Once
the criteria of either test have been met, then the people seeking
independence have the standing to invoke the right of self-
determination.
One test is set out in the first paragraph of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples.0 5 This paragraph sets forth three specific criteria required of
a people seeking to assert the right of self-determination. These
criteria are that: (1) the people are subjugated, (2) the people are
territorily based, and (3) the movement is made up of a colonial
people. '
0 6
The people on Taiwan have satisfied the criteria under this
test. The first criteria requires that the people must be subjugated,
and defines' 017 a subjugated people are those who have been denied
basic human rights.'0 8 In retrospect, the situation on Taiwan con-
cerning (1) representation in government,0 9 (2) the cancellation of
the 1978 general election,' and (3) the overwhelming denial of
numerous individual rights and freedoms' have all served to evi-
102. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 74 and 85.
103. G.A. Res. 637, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); G.A.
Res. 648, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 33, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
104. L. BUCHHEIT, SUCCESSION 11 (1978).
105. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
The second test that is articulated is essentially a more general version of the first. Under
this test, two general requirements must be met: (1) the group seeking independence must
share a common group identity, and (2) group members must exercise the right of self-deter-
mination in a collective manner. MUSTAFA, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 479, 481 (1971).
106. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 105,
107. Id.
108. Subjugate is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "to bring under the yoke or power
of dominion; conquer by force and compel to submit as a subject to the government of
another (colonial powers subjugating native peoples). WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY, (1977 ed.). See A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DE-
TERMINATION 51-52 (1973).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 128-144.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 145-150.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 151-163.
Vol. 14
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 [], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss3/5
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TAIWAN
dence the subjugation of the people on Taiwan by the existing pow-
ers there.
The requirement that a people be territorily based is also met
by the people of Taiwan. This requirement may be satisfied by
showing that the group asserting the right has an affinity with the
land which they seek to claim through self-determination." 12 The
Taiwanese people have established such an affinity through their
continuous inhabitance of Taiwan for over five centuries.'t 3 In
contrast, the Chinese of the Communist mainland and the main-
landers who make up the Nationalist government have few, if any,
ties to the land of Taiwan." 4 Thus, the native Taiwanese who in-
habit the island are the ones who hold the right to assert self-
determination.
The "colonial people" requirement is fulfilled when the group
of people seeking self-determination express their desires to gain
independence." 5 The Taiwanese, both in Taiwan and abroad,
have brought their desires for independence to the forefront of
world affairs." 6 This can be seen in the numerous independence
groups that have sprung up as well as in the voluminous literature
that has been distributed relative to this issue." 7 Accordingly the
facts show that the Taiwanese have met the requirements for a rec-
ognizable self-determination movement.
III. INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT WITHIN TAIWAN AND ABROAD
CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
The present situation in Taiwan highlights the Taiwanese peo-
ples' desire to achieve independence through self-determination. In
effect, Taiwan's international legal status was never determined af-
ter the Japanese surrendered occupation of it at the close of World
War II."1s The native Taiwanese are a group of people who seek
independence, not from a colonial ruler, but from the Nationalist
112. MUSTAFA, supra note 105, at 481.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
115. See W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 74.
116. See supra notes 29 and 31; see infra text accompanying notes 118-163, 208-10. In
addition to the extensive documentation of a movement for Taiwan's independence, there
have also been several uprisings in Taiwan in which the main purpose was to voice the
people's desire for independence. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1980, at A6, col. 3; Jan. 23,
1970, at 6, col. 4; Apr. 25, 1970, at i, col. 5; Apr. 19, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
117. See supra notes 29 and 31; see infra text accompanying notes 208-10.
118. See L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 95. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 61-70.
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government, which, as an occupation authority has sought to im-
pose its rule over them. 9 The Taiwanese are invoking the princi-
ple against "the existing authority of unauthorized occupation, for
the purposes of establishing an independent state." E Although the
Nationalists still claim to be the legitimate government of all of
China,' 2 ' international legal principles do not support such an as-
sertion.'22 Moreover, the goal that they will one day return to the
mainland has lost credibility among the international community
and the majority of people on Taiwan.'23 Currently, there exists a
strong movement by a majority of the Taiwanese people to replace
the Nationalist government and establish an independent nation in
Taiwan through self-determination.124 This movement is based on
several factors.
A. Tension Between Native Taiwanese and Mainlanders
One factor responsible for the movement to replace the Na-
tionalist government is the persistent tension in relations between
native Taiwanese and mainlanders living on the island.'25 This
tension is evidenced by the large numbers of the Taiwanese popula-
tion who coii-in--e to openly express their discontent and desire to
achieve independence from the Nationalist government.'26 It has
been stated that the continued oppression by the "security forces"
of the Nationalist government has made the government an object
of hatred to virtually all Taiwanese and even to many mainlanders
residing on Taiwan." '127
B. Denial of Adequate Representation
Another factor which has brought about the movement toward
self-determination on the island is that the local Taiwanese popula-
tion has been denied an adequate share of their representation in
the political affairs of the country.'28 The population now consists
of approximately 17.4 million people. 29 Apart from a very small
119. L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, supra note 20, at 95.
120. Id
121. Id. at 599.
122. Id.
123. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 598 (testimony of A. Doak Barnett).
124. See generally Hearings on United States Relations With the PRC, supra note 29.
125. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 602.
126. Id. at 604.
127. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1979, at A23, col. 4.
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minority of non-Chinese, 3 ° Taiwan is primarily populated by peo-
ple of ethnic Chinese origin. This Chinese population, however, is
divided into several groups which have cultural and linguistic dif-
ferences.' 3' Approximately 13.6 percent of the population are Chi-
nese mainlanders, while the remaining 86.4 percent are
Taiwanese. 1
32
The government of Taiwan consists of a National Assembly
which meets once every six years to elect a President. The law-
making body is called the Legislative Yuan.133 The current repre-
sentatives for both bodies were elected on the mainland in 1948.114
The officials of these bodies are almost entirely comprised of mem-
bers of Taiwan's mainland population. No general elections have
been held since 1948, because the government claims that elections
cannot be held until the mainland is recovered. 35 The average age
of the existing Nationalist leadership is now 78 years, which will
neccessitate their replacement in the near future.1
36
The native Taiwanese assert that their population of 14.5 mil-
lion people is disproportionately and inadequately represented in
the Nationalist government. 137 The statistics show that of the 1,288
representatives who hold positions in the National Assembly, only
88 are native Taiwanese. 138 Of the 436 members in the Legislative
Yuan, only forty-nine are native Taiwanese. 39 In a statement
made to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Pell
summed up the dilemma regarding representation of the Taiwanese
people when he said that these figures are "not a very good record
as far as respecting the will of the majority of the country; espe-
cially when one bears in mind that more than eighty percent of the
people are [to be] represented in those ratios."' 4
It is clear that the central political problem in Taiwan is that
130. This part of the population consists of approximately 200,000 of the 174 million




134. id It is important to note that this election did not include the representation of any
of the inhabitants of Taiwan.
135. Id.
136. Li, A Perspective on Taiwan, 14 INT'L LAW. 73, 75 (1980).
137. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 46, 651 (testimony of Senator Claieborne Pell).
138. Id. at 651. These figures represent the organization of Premier Y.S. Sun's cabinet,
presided over by President Chiang Ching-kuo, as established in May, 1980.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 141, 651.
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the Taiwanese are restrained from obtaining adequate representa-
tion in the national government.' 41 The Nationalist rationale for
depriving such representation is based on the continuing claim that
the government must be representative of all of China and not just
Taiwan. 42 Presently, seventy percent of the Nationalist govern-
ment are not native Taiwanese. 143 This reality has caused an in-
creasing number of Taiwanese to revolt and demand proportionate
representation. Because ROC Nationalists have continually ig-
nored their pleas, many Taiwanese consider self-determination of
an independent Taiwan as their only remedy.144
C Cancellation of the 1978 General Election
A third factor which has strengthened the internal movement
for self-determination is the cancellation of the scheduled elections
of 1978. 14 One week after President Carter formally recognized
the PRC, elections were cancelled throughout Taiwan.146 The rea-
son given by the Nationalist government was to "avoid unrest."'
147
For thirty-three years the majority of Taiwanese people have
lived under martial law. This has prohibited their participation in
any significant political activity. 148 Cancellation of the 1978 elec-
tion appears only to have "whetted the demand for a democratic
government." 149 A well-known specialist on Taiwan politics and a
prominent resident of Taiwan commented that "had the elections
taken place, the Kuomingtang (Nationalist) would have taken a
beating. They were frightened. They panicked."' 50
D Denial of Individual Rights and Freedoms
A fourth factor which has caused a high level of consciousness
toward self-determination in Taiwan is the persistent denial of indi-




144. Id. at 438, 555.
145. Id at 146 (testimony of Victor Li, Stanford University School of Law, Palo Alto,
California); see also Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1979, at A8, col. 1, wherein a complete listing of the
cabinet positions and the names of the individuals occupying them may be found.
146. Id. at 146 (testimony of Victor Li).
147. Id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
149. Wash. Post. Feb. 3, 1979, at A8, col. 1; see also Hearings, supra 6, at 388-9.
150. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 388-9.
Vol. 14
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vidual rights and freedoms by the Nationalist government. 15 ' The
ROC Constitution, which was adopted in Nanking on mainland
China in December, 1946, guarantees certain fundamental
rights. 152 Among these rights are freedom of speech, writing, teach-
ing, and publication; 153 personal freedom; 54 freedom of residence
and change of residence; 15 5 freedom of privacy of correspon-
dence;156 freedom of religious beliefs;157 freedom of assembly and
association; 158 and freedom to petition.' 59 The Constitution is
equally applicable to the rights of the Taiwanese under the Nation-
alist government.
161
The seizure- of Taiwan by the Nationalist government in
1949,16 1 and its subsequent proclamation of martial law suspended
all provisions of individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
ROC Constitution.162 The Nationalists have declared that the sus-
pension will last as long as the "Communist Rebellion" exists on
the China mainland. 163 It is apparent that the deprivation of fun-
damental rights by the existing government is a major factor that
has fueled the present movement toward self-determination. The
Taiwan Relations Act, however, has effectively provided a channel
whereby native Taiwanese may gain relief from Nationalist
oppression.
IV. THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT HAS LAID THE FOUNDATION
FOR THE TAIWANESE TO PROCEED TO INDEPENDENCE
THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION
Prior to the Taiwan Relations Act," 4 the United States recog-
nized the Nationalist or Kuomingtang authority as at least the de
i65to 66facto government of China. 66 The United States, however, like
151. Id. at 552, 553, 557, 817.
152. Id. at 557.
153. Id.; see also REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONSTITUTION art. 113 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
ROC CONST.].
154. Hearings, supra note 6 at 557; see also ROC CONST., supra note 153, at art. 8.





160. Id. art. 113.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56.
162. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 557.
163. Id
164. Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
165. "Defaclo" is used to describe a government which is exercising power as if it is
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many other nations of the world,'6 7 maintained relations with the
Chinese as though "two Chinas" existed. 68 The PRC feared that
this might lead to Taiwan's de jure6 9 legal independence.' The
PRC consistently asserted that there was only one China, and that
Taiwan was a part of that nation.' The PRC acted against dejure
recognition of Taiwan by the United States by conditioning any
normalization of relations between the PRC and United States on
the coincidental termination of relations between the United States
and the ROC. 72
On the other hand, if the United States had encouraged the
ROC to pursue independence prior to the Taiwan Relations Act,
such a move would have been in direct opposition to the desires of
the Nationalist government. 7 3 This is attributable to the fact that
the Nationalist government of the ROC was as adamantly opposed
to a "two-China" policy as its mainland counterpart.' 74 Both sides
held fast to the idea that the other side was in possession of an
"unliberated territory of their Chinese brothers."' 7 5
The 1979 passage of the Taiwan relations Act 7 6 has considera-
bly altered the political and economic situation of Taiwan and the
PRC. 77 As part of the normalization process with the PRC, the
United States has adopted a new policy of non-recognition 178 to-
wards the ROC pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act. 179 Prior to
the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States had an obligation to
legally constituted to do so, but in fact is not. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 818-820 (2d ed. 1980).
166. Gable, Taiwan Relations Act: Legislative Re-Recognition, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 511, 512 (1979).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. "De Jurd" is defined as recognition extended to a new government by right. WEB-
STER, supra note 108, at 299.
170. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 599 (exerpt from BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, CHINA AND
THE MAJOR POWERS IN EAST ASIA, (1977)).
171. Id. at 551.
172. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
173. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 599.
174. Id. The Republic of China continues to maintain that reunification of China is the
only solution to the China situation.
175. Id.
176. See Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
177. Hearings, supra note 6, at 437 (testimony of Ralph N. Clough, Fellow, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars).
178. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
179. See generally Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
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help defend Taiwan from outside aggression.180 In addition, there
were treaties between the two countries which were important to
Taiwan's survival. Moreover, there were many trade agreements
which Taiwan and the United States depended on.'' Thus, some
form of arrangement was essential to permit relations to continue
between the two countries on an unofficial basis.18 2
The Taiwan Relations Act dealt with these important consid-
erations.'" 3 The Act allows agencies of the Untied States govern-
ment to conduct relations with Taiwan through the American
Institute in Taiwan. 84 This non-profit corporation continues to
carry out diplomatic and consular business in Taiwan as though
there existed a recognized diplomatic mission or consulate.'85 Cor-
respondingly, Taiwan established a counterpart organization called
the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to serve a
similar function.' 86 The officials of these newly created entities
were granted the same privileges and immunities as officials of dip-
lomatic missions.
87
The Taiwan Relations Act also reinforced the United States'
determination to prevent outside interference with Taiwan's inter-
180. See MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, supra note 63.
181. Clough, Taiwan's InternationaL Status, I CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L AFF. 17, 26 (1981).
182. Id. This is primarily attributable to the fact that the United States wanted to con-
tinue its economic ties with Taiwan. In addition, the United States had made a strong com-
mittment to aid in the defense of Taiwan from outside aggression. There had to be some
type of arrangement to prevent a breach of that promise. Id.
183. See Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
184. Clough, supra note 181, at 27. The specific language of the Act is as follows:
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN
Sec. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out
by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to
Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be con-
ducted and carried out by or through-
(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated
under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may
designate, (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").
(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is
authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into,
perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan,
such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in
the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.
(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of
Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof which the Institute is
incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the perform-
ance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such law, rule, regulation,
or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.
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national status.' The United States declared that any effort by
another country to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means would be considered a threat to peace and security
in the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United
States.18 9 In order to be certain that aggression did not result from
derecognition, the Act states that the United States would provide
Taiwan with defensive arms and seek to resist any form of coercion
that would jeopardize the economic or social system of the people
of that country.' 90 The Act specified that all treaties or agreements
between the United States and the ROC that existed prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1979 would continue in force unless expressly terminated. 191
In addition, the laws of the United States would continue to be
applied to Taiwan identically as they had been prior to the Act. 1
92
In response to the PRC's demand that the United States de-
nounce its recognition of Taiwan, the United States "acknowleged"
that there was only "one China."' 193 In an attempt to avoid harmful
effects between the United States and the PRC, the United States,
by way of the Act, also left the question of Taiwan's status to be
188. Id. The Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3, at 22 U.S.C. § 3302 states:
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY
WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN
Sec. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the
United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense serv-
ices in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capability.
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and the quan-
tity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the
needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determi-
nation of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military
authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to
the security or the social or the economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and
the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appro-
priate action by the United States in response to any such danger.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 22 U.S.C. § 3303 states:
APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Sec. 4. (a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect
the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the
laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the
laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
192. Id. More specifically, 22 U.S.C. § 3303, sec. 4, states:
(b) (I) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, na-
tions, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall
apply with respect to Taiwan.
193. The translation of "acknowledged" was used differently depending on whether the
Chinese or English version was used. For definition of such translation, see Hearings, supra
note 6, at 29, 146.
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resolved in the future by the Chinese people themselves. Mean-
while, the United States still maintains that it has never declared
Taiwan to be a part of China,'94 and the Taiwan Relations Act
supports the assertion that the United States takes no position with
regard to Taiwan's current legal status. 195
The United States derecognition of the Nationalist govern-
ment, in conjunction with its position of non-intervention, has
opened the door to those Taiwanese who seek to establish an in-
dependent nation on Taiwan.' 96 In effect, the Taiwan Relations Act
has created a new and separate entity, at least in the eyes of the
United States. 97 This new entity possesses all of the attributes of
an independent sovereign nation, even though it lacks a clearly de-
fined legal status in regard to international recognition.198
The derecognition as accomplished by the Act has brought
about the feasibility of a new and independent Taiwanese govern-
ment. Moreover, obstacles such as the claim posed by both the
PRC and ROC Nationalists that there is one China no longer exist.
Such claims have lost credibility, and such a plan is not only re-
jected as unrealistic by the Chinese,' 99 but is also viewed by the
international community as an implausible alternative.2" One his-
torian has commented that "The fact is that they (the ROC and
PRC) are evading reality. . . there are two Chinese states, and two
Chinese governments, and this has been the dilemma and the situa-
tion for nearly 30 years." 0' In light of the changed circumstances
brought on by the Taiwan Relations Act, the major barriers to a
self-determined and independent state on Taiwan are now
diminished.202
There exists a strong sentiment in the United States and
abroad which advocates that the time has come for Taiwanese self-
194. Id. at 611.
195. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 611 (statement by A. Doake Barnett).
196. Id. at 551.
197. See Oakes, supra note 5.
198. Id.
199. Initially, the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung acknowledged that
Taiwan was a "weak and small nation" which would have to have its own independent
course of revolution and its own authentic sovereignty. This statement was made in the
1930's. Obviously, the political position of the Chinese Communist's has since changed. The
PRC would seem to prefer to maintain the "status quo" over any action by Taiwan to seek
independence at this time. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 866.
200. Id. at 146, 389 and 598.
201. Id. at 577.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 176-198.
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determination and independence.2 °3 The general consensus may be
summed up in the statement that "Taiwan is going through a tran-
sition from being the Republic of China representing all of China
to some new and still undefined status. What that new status
should be must ultimately be decided by the people of Taiwan.
204
Moreover, the United States has declared that the "Taiwan ques-
tion should be determined by the Chinese themselves. 20 5 United
States Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island has stated that "I
have always believed that the United States made a mistake in sup-
porting Chaing Kai-shek's contention that his regime was the gov-
ernment of all China. We would be much better off and truer to
our professed principle of self-determination if we . . . pressed for
an independent Taiwan.
' 206
In addition, the French government has made clear that Tai-
wan's undetermined status "must be decided" by "taking the
wishes of the Formosan (Taiwanese) population into considera-
tion. '2 7 Moreover, there reportedly exists a large majority of peo-
ple on Taiwan, of both Taiwanese and mainland descent, who
favor independence for Taiwan. 2 8 Their voice, however, has often
been muffled by the Nationalist government through its martial law
authority.
20 9
There are also numerous groups outside Taiwan who continue
to promote the wishes of that country's majority.2 0 Such groups
state that the United States supported the ROC as the "free China"
in their movement against Communism for many years. 21  During
those years, the United States ignored the plight of the majority of
the 17 million people on the island.212 These groups contend that
because the United States and the PRC have established relations,
203. See supra note 29.
204. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 147 (statement of Victor Li's testimony before the
Senate Committee).
205. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
206. Hearings, supra note 6, at 549.
207. See N.Y. Times, April 24, 1964, at 4, col. 4.
208. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1964, at 36, col. 6.
209. Hearings, supra note 6, at 552.
210. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 6, at 546 (Overseas Alliance for Democratic Rule); id.
at 574 (Taiwanese Association of America); N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 40, col. 5
(Formosan Christians for Independence); N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1971, at 37, col. I (Formosan
Peoples Conference; Asian Center); N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1970, at 3, col. 1 (World United
Formosans for Independence).
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the ROC is no longer recognized.213 Thus, they declare that "the
time for self-determination and the well-being of those 17 million
people has finally arrived."2 4
It is important that the decision of Taiwan's future status be
determined by the majority of the people on Taiwan.215 The
Taiwanese are the ones who have a direct stake in their "nation's"
future. The Taiwan Relations Act effectively provides the founda-
tion upon which the Taiwanese can build a means to achieve the
desires of the majority of its peoples.
The enactment of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 2 16 virtually
eliminates the existence of the ROC and the Nationalist govern-
ment in the eyes of the United States.2" 7 In its place, the United
States has created the American Institute on Taiwan. 8 That body
has been given the legal status providing that "whenever any law,
regulation, or order of the United States refers or relates to a for-
eign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity, such
terms shall include . . . and apply with respect to Taiwan. 2 19
Since the government of the ROC is no longer recognized by the
United States, the term "Taiwan," as used in the statute, applies
specifically to the people on that island.220 As a result, all diplo-
matic and legal relations that the United States carries out with the
nations of the world shall be equally applicable to the people of
Taiwan. Thus, the Act designates the Taiwan Institute as the func-
tional body through which implemention of future intercourse be-
tween the United States and the people of Taiwan shall be
accomplished.22'
Although the United States maintains that notwithstanding the
creation of the Taiwan institute there exists only an unofficial rela-
tionship with Taiwan,22 2 this unofficial relationship does not pro-
vide for recognition of the Nationalist government as the
"legitimate government" of the people of Taiwan.223 The agree-
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1975, at 22, col. 2.
216. See Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3.
217. See Oakes, supra note 5.
218. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 192.
220. Title I, § 102 provides that such terms as "foreign country," "nation," "state," as
used in United States' legislation, will include the people of Taiwan. Id.
221. See Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3302.
222. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 18.
223. See generally Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-16.
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ment promulgated by the Act derecognized any claim to govern-
ment that the Nationalist may have over Taiwan."u4 In addition,
the United States continues to maintain that it also does not recog-
nize the PRC as the legitimate government of Taiwan.225
The legitimacy of the Nationalist government in Taiwan rests
on the contention that it is the successor of the government that
ruled the mainland before 1949.226 The justification for the domi-
nant role held by the people from the mainland in the Nationalist
government is that it represents all of China. 227 That justification is
now non-existent. In light of the non-recognized status of the ROC
and the Nationalist government, the United States has opened the
door and laid a foundation for the Taiwanese people to establish a
new government.228 The Taiwanese people could propose a refer-
endum setting forth the desires of the majority of the island's popu-
lation, and therein align the status of their island and its
government with those desires. The United Nation's Trusteeship
system could be utilized to ensure that the interests of the
Taiwanese majority are best served.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A UNITED
NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP TO ESTABLISH A NEW
GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN
The necessity for the creation of a trusteeship in Taiwan is
largely attributable to the adamant oppostion against an independ-
ent Taiwan by both the PRC and the present Nationalist govern-
ment of Taiwan. This opposition seems to evidence the need for
such a "moderator" to determine the will of the majority of people
on Taiwan. By trust agreement, Taiwan would be placed under the
trusteeship system for the purpose of holding neutral elections.
This arrangement would allow the inhabitants of Taiwan to deter-
mine their own leadership and sovereignty. Upon establishment of
a new government, the trusteeship would terminate. In light of the
strong movement for independence among the Taiwanese and the
advancing ages of the members of the present ROC government,
the United States is in a good position to propose such a trusteeship
at this time.
224. Id.
225. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 600.
226. Clough, supra note 9, at 17, 19.
227. Id
228. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
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Chaper XII, Article 75 of the United Nations Charter provides
"that the United Nations shall establish, under its authority, an in-
ternational trusteeship system for the administration and supervi-
sion of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent
individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to
as trust territories." '229 In addition, Article 76 of the UN Charter
lends itself well to the creation of a trust territory on Taiwan.23°
Among other things,2 3 ' Article 76 seeks to "promote the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants
of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards
self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
232
The trusteeship system was intended to cover three categories
of territories: (1) former mandates, (2) former enemy territories,
and (3) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states re-
sponsible for their administration.233 The trusteeship system could
be made applicable to Taiwan by virtue of the third category.
The effect of placing a territory such as Taiwan under the trus-
teeship system is merely to recognize the principle of international
accountability for the welfare of the territory's native inhabit-
ants.234 Accountability is promoted through the United Nation's
supervision, which involves periodic visits, examination of annual
reports submitted by the administering authority, and other actions
in conformity with the trusteeship agreement.235 The objective of
the trust is to further the "progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particu-
lar circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned .. 236 Once this ob-
jective is accomplished in Taiwan, the trusteeship would dissolve.
In determining how such a trusteeship would be supervised, it
appears feasible for the United Nations to appoint a Trust Commit-
tee. This Trust Committee would be composed of not only repre-
sentatives from Taiwan's native population, but also of Chinese
229. U.N. CHARTER art. 75, chap. 12.
230. Id. art. 76.
231. Article 76 also sets forth the administration of such trusteeships. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. C. TOUSSIANT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11 (1956).
235. See U.N. CHARTER art. 87; see also TOUSSIANT, supra note 234, at 11, 179-99.
236. U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).
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mainlanders in Taiwan. In recognition of the great impact that an
independent Taiwan would have on other countries of the world, a
combination of UN member countries, especially those in Asia,
should also be represented by the committee. The Trust Commit-
tee would in turn supervise the organization and creation of a via-
ble and representative government on the island of Taiwan.
Obviously, the existing Nationalist government and the gov-
ernment of the PRC will strongly object to such a trusteeship. The
trusteeship system, however, was devised by the United Nations to
overcome the very obstacles posed by the Taiwan situation. The
primary objective of the the UN Charter is to further the advance-
ment and progressive development of self-government or indepen-
dence, as freely expressed by the peoples concerned. The Trust
Committee would ascertain the wishes of the majority of Taiwan's
people, and accordingly make the appropriate recommendations to
the UN General Assembly. Assuming that the general consensus
of the people of Taiwan would be to establish a new and independ-
ent government, the Trust Committee would then supervise the
elections conducted on the island for its establishment. Upon com-
pletion of its duties, and at a time when the new government was
operating at a level satisfactory to the UN General Assembly, the
Trust Committee would be dissolved. The critical issue here is not
the degree of opposition that the creation of a trusteeship would
generate, but the plausibility and mechanics of effectively supervis-
ing the establishment of the new government. The Taiwan Rela-
tions Act paves the way for such a reform, and the UN trusteeship
provides the necessary vehicle to accomplish that end.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, the legit-
imacy of the ROC and the Nationalist government are no longer a
reality in international law.2 37 The people of Taiwan, who have
been subject to that government for over 30 years, are in perhaps
the best position in their history to seek independence.238
The entities of Taiwan and mainland China have been divided
for almost four centuries.239 Each has developed a unique identity
and culture which further evidences their differences. At the end of
237. See Oakes, supra note 5.
238. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 436-37 (testimony of Professor Parris H. Chang, Penn-
sylvania State University Political Science Department).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 34-45.
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World War II, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Command
in the Pacific required the surrender of Taiwan by Japan to the
Allied forces.240 General Chiang Kai-Shek founded the Nationalist
government on Taiwan in October of 1945. Subsequently, the Na-
tionalist forces fighting the Civil War on the mainland were de-
feated and the PRC was established on the mainland in October,
1949.24 1 The remaining mainland Nationalist fled to Taiwan and
assumed positions of authority within the ROC.2 42
Martial law has been imposed by the Chinese Nationalist gov-
ernment since 1949.243 The Taiwanese population has since been
deprived of proportionate representation in the political system of
Taiwan. 244 Although the Taiwanese comprise 85 percent of the
population,245 they occupy a mere 5 percent of the ranking political
offices. Martial law has also been a source of the Nationalists' de-
nial of fundamental rights as set forth in the country's constitution.
These conditions have spurred both the current plea for self-deter-
mination and the Taiwan independence movement at home and
abroad.246
The cession of Taiwan by Japan renounced all Japan's claims
to Taiwan,247 but did not provide for a beneficiary. 248 The sover-
eignty of Taiwan is therefore, "undetermined," and should be de-
cided by the People of Taiwan.2 49 The American Institute on
Taiwan, the entity created by the Taiwan Relations Act,250 effec-
tively provides the Taiwanese people with the necessary qualifica-
tions to invoke statehood through the principle of self-
determination.25' At this time, Taiwan possesses the requisite ele-
ments of: (a) a subjected people, (b) a territorily based people, and
(c) a movement made up of a colonial people.252 With these ele-
ments present, Taiwan is now "ripe" to pursue a course of indepen-
dence via the principle of self-determination. The Taiwan
240. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
241. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 867.
242. Id. at 38.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25, 57 and 137-39.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 16 and 132.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 31, 117 and 208-210.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
248. Id.
249. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 600.
250. See generally Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 3, at §§ 3301-16. See also supra note
184 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 200-02.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 102-117.
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Relations Act has in effect provided a vehicle through which other
nations recognizing the PRC could establish an entity similar to the
Taiwan Institute on Taiwan. The purpose of such action would be
twofold: (1) to maintain economic ties with Taiwan while recogniz-
ing the PRC, and (2) to ease the PRC toward the ultimate reality of
Taiwan's independence.
The suggested medium for gaining sovereign independence for
the people of Taiwan is through the application of the international
legal principle of self-determination. This could be accomplished
by the establishment of a UN trusteeship. The trusteeship would
take into account the respective interests of the United States, Tai-
wan, China, and "affected Asian countries" to ensure a satisfactory
result. The major purpose of the trusteeship is recognized as pro-
viding a systematic means to ascertain the wishes of the majority of
Taiwan's 17.8 million people. Once a representative government is
established, the trusteeship would dissolve.
It is recognized that opposition by the PRC is a likely result of
such a proposal. However, in light of the current stalemate be-
tween Taiwan and the PRC and the potential threat that the two
entities pose to each other, it is possible that the Chinese will bal-
ance the interests and eventually agree to Taiwan's independence.
Nonetheless, it is important that the international community rec-
ognize and properly accord the Taiwanese people the rights to
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